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The Investor in Structured Retail Products: Marketing 




Structured retail products (SRP) are one of the most visible faces of financial innovation 
and are becoming increasingly popular amongst retail investors. However, there is 
strong consensus that retail investors’ preference for structured products is difficult to 
explain using the standard rational theory, those products being in general sold at a 
significant premium. Studying the actual trading behavior of individual investors we 
provide evidence consistent with the view that SRP likely offer value to some informed 
investors compared to other products, that product complexity is a way to complete 
markets and that SRP allow investors to access segments otherwise not available to 
them. Nonetheless, our results also suggest that the increasing popularity of SRP is 
deeply related to investors’ behavioral biases, particularly overconfidence and 
gambling. Moreover, results also show that SRP trading activity cannot be dissociated 
from aggressive marketing practices.   
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The Investor in Structured Retail Products: Marketing 





Structured retail products (SRP) are one of the most visible faces of financial 
innovation and are increasingly popular amongst retail investors. The number of SRP 
issued in Europe has been rising in recent years, reaching more than 850,000 in 2011. 
However, it is by now well established that these products are generally sold at a 
significant premium. Bergstresser (2008), Bernard et al. (2010), Grünbichler and 
Wohlwend (2005), Henderson and Pearson (2011), Jørgensen et al. (2011), 
Szymanowska et al. (2009), Wallmeier and Diethelm (2008), among others, address the 
subject of the pricing of different SRP in different markets and contexts and conclude 
that these products are persistently overpriced. 
Some arguments have been put forward that might justify the rationality of the 
increased retail demand for SRP. The low interest rate environment creates incentives 
to search for yield (Kiriakopoulos and Mavralexakis 2011), and structured products that 
promise a high maximum return may be purchased. SRP’s ability to offer exposure on 
some asset classes and market segments that are otherwise not available for retail 
investors (Schneider and Giobanu 2010), as well as taxation (Nicolaus 2010), may also 
foster demand.   
However, many other researchers claim that investors’ preferences to SRP depart 
from the standard rational expectations theory. It is the case of, for example, Henderson 
and Pearson (2008), Hens and Rieger (2011), Nicolaus (2010), Szymanowska et al. 
(2009), and Vanini and Dobeli (2010). As Herderson and Pearson (2008) put it, “it is 
difficult to rationalize investor demand for structured equity products within any 
plausible normative model of the behavior of rational investors”. In this line of research, 
we think that the increasing popularity of SRP can be better explained by behavioral 
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factors like the mental accounting bias, overconfidence or desire for gambling. Das and 
Statman (2012) argue that SRP can help improve portfolio allocation for investors with 
a mental accounting bias. According to this behavioral perspective, portfolios are 
composed of mental account sub-portfolios, each associated with a particular objective. 
Investors optimize each mental account by finding the assets and the asset allocation 
that maximize the expected return of each mental account sub-portfolio, such as 
retirement income or bequest. Some other behavioral biases may also explain the over 
investment in SRP, like investors’ overconfidence or love for gambling. Overconfident 
investors have been associated with excessive risk taking (Dorn and Huberman 2005; 
Nosic and Weber 2010), that meaning they are more prone to take on risk for which 
there is no apparent reward and consequently more prone to invest in SRP. Similarly, 
recent research postulates that some individual investors view trading in the stock 
market as an opportunity to gamble. For instance, Barber et al. (2009) document that 
the introduction of the government-sponsored lottery in Taiwan did reduce the stock 
market turnover by about a quarter, apparently showing that part of the excessive 
trading of individual investors is motivated by their gambling desire. 
Related to this literature, recent works on individual financial literacy seem to show 
that the higher the individual financial knowledge, the more efficient and rational will 
be her/his financial behavior, such as planning and saving for retirement (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2009), investing in the stock market (Christelis et al. 2010) or diversifying 
portfolio (Abreu and Mendes 2010). 
Another stream of literature emphasizes the aggressive marketing strategies as the 
main reason for the increasing popularity of SRP. But, how do issuers and distributers 
convince retail investors to buy these persistently overpriced structured products? 
Quite often, the selling pressure imposed by financial intermediaries conditions the 
marketing of SRP, thus influencing the demand. Aggressive marketing is not uncommon 
because financial intermediaries’ profits from SRP are higher than profits from other 
products (Kiriakopoulos and Mavralexakis 2011). Chang et al. (2010) reports that 
financially illiterate retail investors are in essence pulled by product distributors 
regardless of the product’s costs. Sometimes SRP offer capital protection and this may 
allow high risk aversion investors to invest in these products by looking only at the 
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potential upside of returns. The literature produced on the subject focuses on investors’ 
misperception of the enclosed risks and on the poor ex-post performance of SRP. In fact, 
the retail investor may not have the expertise to understand the complexities of these 
products, to compute or estimate the probabilities of the different pay-offs of the 
products, and misunderstands them. Issuing firms, on the other hand, may introduce 
complexity to exploit uninformed (Henderson and Pearson 2011) or naïve investors 
(Campbell 2006) and to extract consumer surplus (Carlin and Manso 2009), and as a 
result are able to overprice them.  
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 2011) issued a 
report that summarizes the results of an examination of the retail structured products 
placed by several broker-dealers. It was concluded that “sales of structured products to 
retail investors … may continue to increase as they are marketed as a higher return 
investment alternative” and that broker-dealers might have recommended unsuitable 
structured securities products to retail investors and traded at prices disadvantageous 
to retail investors.  
In spite of the increased relevance of SRP for retail investors, little is known regarding 
the profile of those most likely to invest in these complex financial instruments and 
there is little evidence on the real impact of aggressive marketing or of overconfidence 
and the desire for gambling on the trading of SRP. For example, are wealthier, or more 
experienced investors less likely to invest in SRP and thus less likely to “get hurt” by the 
mis-seling practices of financial intermediaries? Do less knowledgeable investors invest 
more in SRP? Among those who invest in SRP is there any difference between those who 
trade more often and those who trade more infrequently? What is the impact of the 
marketing of these products on the popularity of SRP? Are overconfident investors more 
prone to SRP assets? 
In this paper we will answer these questions with the help of a proprietary dataset 
of one of the largest Portuguese financial intermediaries which documents the history 
of individual investors' trades in securities over more than a decade. The information in 
the database includes detailed socio-economic and financial information on individual 
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investors who traded in securities at least once over the period January 1997 – April 
2011. 
In this context, this study contributes to characterizing the profile of individual (ie, 
non-institutional) investors in SRP. Using data from the Portuguese market, this paper 
aims to answer the following questions: What are the main socio-demographic 
characteristics of SRP investors? What is the influence of some investors’ behavioral 
biases (overconfidence and gambling) in characterizing the investor in SRP? What is the 
impact of marketing on the sale of these products? Does the level of investors’ financial 
literacy have any influence on SRP trading activity? 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on structured retail products in some 
important aspects. Firstly, the design of our research combines actual trading behavior 
of individual investors with a survey of individual investors conducted by a securities 
regulator. Secondly, as far as we know this is the first study that analyzes whether 
investors in SRP are different than other investors, thus filling a gap in the academic 
literature. Thirdly, and more important, we test the validity of some theoretical 
hypotheses put forth to explain the investment in SRP by retail investors. It is the case of 
overconfidence, gambling and the marketing of these products. 
We start out documenting that investors in SRP have different socio-demographic 
characteristics than investors in other financial instruments. We then test the impact of 
financial literacy on the investment in SRP and conclude that more knowledgeable and 
sophisticated investors are more likely to invest in SRP. This is consistent with the idea 
that if product complexity is a way to complete markets, then more knowledgeable and 
sophisticated retail investors will be offered (and will invest in) more complex structured 
products. We also conclude that overconfident investors participate (and trade) more in 
the structured retail product market, and that the contact between the product 
distributor and the investor is most relevant. Therefore, marketing is a strong 
determinant of the investment is SRP thus providing a rationale for overpricing. Finally, 
our results allow us to conclude that gambling may justify investors’ irrationality when 
they opt for SRP. 
The study is structured as follows: The next section describes the database used. The 
third section traces the socio-demographic profile of investors in SRP, making a 
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comparison with equity investors and the general Portuguese population. In section 4 
alternative models are estimated to help define the profile of investors in SRP and 
evaluate the influence of behavioral traits in this characterization. In the last section 
some final conclusions are drawn.  
 
2. The database 
The main database used in this study contains information from one of the top five 
Portuguese banks. The information relates to the accounts of individual investors that 
were active in late April 20113 and includes socio-demographic data (marital status, birth 
date, gender, education, occupation and residence) on the first account holder and on 
the existence (or nonexistence) of deposits, consumer loans and mortgages associated 
with the account holders. In addition, we obtained information on all transactions in 
financial instruments linked to these accounts for the period 02/January/1997 to 
30/April/2011, including the date of the transaction, the transaction type (purchase or 
sale), the ISIN code of the financial instrument, the quantity traded and at what price. 
For a comparison with the corresponding characteristics in the Portuguese population 
data from the 2005 INE Statistical Yearbook and the 2001 Census are used. 
A different database is also used. It comes from a survey conducted by CMVM 
(the Portuguese Securities Commission) to identify the characteristics of individual 
Portuguese investors.4 The most recent one was conducted in 2000, and was publicly 
released in May 2005 on the CMVM website. More than fifteen thousand individuals 
were contacted between 2 October and 22 December 2000 using the direct interview 
technique. These individuals were responsible or co-responsible for family investment 
decisions. 1,559 investors in securities were identified. All of these investors were 
interviewed using a structured questionnaire.5 Each questionnaire included socio-
                                                          
3 In general, investors and depositors do not formally close their bank accounts; when they do not want 
to continue their banking relationship with a certain bank, they just bring their balance and portfolio down 
to zero. This characteristic of investors alleviates any potential concerns with survivorship bias.  
4 The survey identifies an investor in securities as one holding one or more of the following assets: stocks, 
bonds, mutual funds, participation certificates and derivatives. 
5 However, non-investors in securities were not all interviewed: a different questionnaire was used with 
1,200 non-investors only. 
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economic questions, questions related to the nature and type of the assets held6 and 
investor experience, as well as questions related to trading behavior (frequency of 
transactions, acquisition of information, etc.) and to investors’ information about 
markets and their agents, and sources of information used. We use this database to 
compute proxies for overconfidence, gambling attitude towards the investment in 
financial products, and the marketing of SRP. We define overconfident investors as 
those who are better than average, that is, those who believe that they know more than 
they actually do, this being measured by the difference, if positive, between self-
reported and actual financial knowledge.7 We consider that investors do have a 
gambling attitude when they do not get any information regarding financial markets and 
products and yet they invest in financial products. Finally, we build a proxy for product 
marketing based on the fact that some investors go personally to the bank to talk to 
their account manager to get informed on financial products’ matters.8 
In the period of about fifteen years covered by the database, there were 32,843 
investors who traded SRP.9 In the same period there were 448,746 who traded stocks. 
This means that for every 14 equity investors only one traded SRP, which is to say that 
the market of these financial instrument is composed of a small percentage of the 
Portuguese population. This may reflect the programs of privatization carried out by 
successive governments (which was somehow associated with the term 'popular 
capitalism') that led many Portuguese families to invest in the stock of firms being 
privatized during this period, as well as the greater complexity of SRP (in comparison 
with stocks) that discouraged the investment in this financial instrument.  
                                                          
6 Unfortunately, there are no questions related to the size of the portfolio, nor the amounts invested in 
each type of asset.  
7 Other proxies have been used in the literature. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) and Bailey et al. (2008), 
for example, classify an investor as overconfident if her/his trading activity is in the top quartile of the 
distribution on investors’ trading activity and if her/his performance is in the bottom quartile of the 
distribution on investors’ performance. We cannot follow this procedure in this paper because not all 
investors have invested in stocks (for which we would be able to compute performance) and we do not 
want to leave aside investors with trading activity in other financial assets (mutual funds, bonds, derivative 
products) for which we do not have complete information to compute performance on those investments. 
8 See the Annex for the methodology to ‘construct’ the overconfidence, gambling and marketing variables. 
9 Structured products can be defined as securities derived from (or based on) other securities, basket of 
securities, indices, commodities or foreign currencies. In this paper, certificates, convertible bonds and 






3. Socio-demographic characterisation of investors in structured retail products 
Unlike the demographics of the general Portuguese population and of most 
investors, less than 25% of the investors in SRP are younger than 45 (Table 1). 
Furthermore, albeit mostly married, SRP investors are married in a higher proportion 
than other investors (but lower than the Portuguese population), and mostly live in 
Porto. Finally, investors in SRP have more qualified occupations than most other 
investors and have a higher education level than the Portuguese population since, for all 
age groups, the proportion of individuals who have completed higher education is higher 
for investors in SRP (but lower than other investors).  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 These socio-demographic characteristics of investors in SRP lead to the conclusion 
that the average investor seems to have a risk profile that does not fit the financial 
instrument that is traded. The literature considers that the more risk-tolerant behavior 
is associated with younger investors who do not have family responsibilities within 
marriage, whereas more qualified professions are generally associated with a higher 
income level and permit taking higher risks.10 On the other hand, higher levels of 
education may be positively associated with greater sophistication, a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition to better understand the characteristics of SRP. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Among the sample there are some investors who invested in SRP only sporadically 
and others who can be designated ‘heavy traders’. In fact, 52.7% have only invested in 
                                                          
10 Barber and Odean (2001) and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) report evidence that married investors, 
women and older investors have less appetite for risk. 
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one SRP (one ISIN code) throughout the sample period, while 3.6% have invested in 
more than 50 different SRP (that is, more than 50 ISIN codes). These two types of 
investors also have different demographic characteristics. Table 2 shows that, compared 
to occasional investors, the heavy traders are younger, are married to a lesser extent, 
mostly reside in Lisbon, and are more educated. However, there is no linearity in the 
structure of occupations in both groups (although blue collar and inactive workers trade 
relatively less). 
 
4. Multivariate analysis 
4.1. Are investors in SRP different than other investors? 
This section presents the results of a multivariate analysis. A probit model is used to 
distinguish the characteristics of investors in SRP among the characteristics of other 
investors. For this purpose only investors who have traded in financial instruments in the 
period January/1997 to April/2011 are selected from our database, residents abroad 
having been excluded. We end up with 560,005 investors in financial instruments, of 
which 31,022 traded at least one structured retail product during the period covered by 
the database.  
Our base model has the following specification: 
SRP = f (Male, Age, Married, Education, Occupation, Place of Residence, Mortgage, 
Consumer loan) 
where11 
SRP = 1, if the investor trades in structured retail products during the period; 
Male = Gender. Is equal to 1 if male; 
Age = Age of investor. Defined as 2011 minus year of birth of the account holder; 
Married = Marital status of the investor. Equals 1 if married; 
                                                          
11 The database does not include any variable directly linked to wealth or income of the investor, which 




Education = Years of education. Four categories are considered: Low = 1, if less than 4 
years of education; Basic = 1, if 4 to 6 years of education; Intermediate = 1, if more than 
6 but 12 or less years of education; High = 1, if a technical or higher course was 
completed; 
Occupation: Four categories are considered: Highly skilled = 1, if the investor is a business 
manager, director, is in the upper levels of public administration or is a specialist in 
science, physics, mathematics, engineering, health, professor, etc; Skilled = 1, if the 
investor is an office work or similar or is farmer, industrial worker, mechanic or non-
qualified worker; Students=1 if the investor is a student; Inactive = 1, if retired or 
unemployed;  
Place of Residence: Lisbon = 1 if residing in Lisbon; Porto = 1 if residing in Porto; rest of 
the country = 1 if residing elsewhere; 
Mortgage = indicator of mortgage. Equal to 1 if the investor has a mortgage;  
Consumer loan = indicator of loan. Equal to 1 if the investor has a consumer loan. 
 
In fact, it has been shown that investors’ behavior depends on socio-economic 
characteristics: age (DaSilva and Giannikos 2004), occupation (Christiansen et al. 2008) 
or the environment in which they live (Goetzmann and Kumar 2008). Calvet et al. (2009) 
concludes that seemingly irrational behavior diminishes substantially with investor 
wealth.  
The probit model is estimated by maximum likelihood.12 The results are shown 
in Table 3, column [1]. Our model includes the basic variables related to socio-
demographic characteristics of investors. The results indicate that, conditioned to 
investors in financial instruments13, not-married men living in Porto who have more 
academic qualifications have a higher probability of being investors in structured retail 
products, the influence of age being non-linear. Regarding occupations, the results show 
                                                          
12 Regarding the educational level, occupation and place of residence, the omitted categories are, 
respectively, less than four years of education, inactive and rest of the country. 




that highly skilled workers (students) have in general a higher (lower) probability to 
become investors in SRP than inactive people, and this could be explained by the 
existence of retired people among the inactive population. As for the existence of 
consumer loans and mortgages (which certainly affect the level of wealth of investors), 
these controls allow us to conclude that the investment is SRP is indeed influenced by 
the existence of loans.  
In short, investors in SRP are different than investors in other financial instruments.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
The literature considers that there are some other specific characteristics that 
influence investor behavior. Chang et al. (2010) finds that financially literate retail 
investors are more rational and include less structured products in the portfolio. 
Campbell (2006) argues that higher educated investors are less likely to make mistakes. 
Thus, more educated investors would be less likely to invest in SRP if the investment in 
SRP is indeed rational. However, if product complexity is a way to complete markets, 
then more knowledgeable investors will be offered more complex products and thus 
more sophisticated retail investors would buy more structured products.  
We provide an empirical test for these predictions. Our model distinguishes 
those investors who may have greater knowledge of financial matters because of their 
education (economists) or occupation (business managers and bank staff). The variable 
"Literacy" is a binary variable equal to 1 if the account holder is an economist, or a 
business manager, or a bank officer. The hypothesis that financial literacy is a 
determinant of investment in SRP is not rejected. Thus, we conclude that more 
knowledgeable and sophisticated investors are more likely to invest in SRP (model [2]). 
This result is consistent with a view that, compared to other products, SRP likely offer 
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value to some informed investors and that SRP are a way to complete markets and allow 
investors to access segments otherwise not available to them.14  
Our results are not ‘contaminated’ by overconfidence. When we control for the 
better than average effect (model [3]), we find that overconfident investors are more 
likely to invest in structured products, which is consistent with Coval and Shumway 
(2005) findings on future traders. An overconfident trader, overly wedded to prior 
beliefs, may discount negative public information that pushes down prices, thus holding 
on and taking on excessive risk. 
It has also been argued that SRP are highly profitable for financial intermediaries 
(because they are sold to retail investors at above ‘fair or model’ price) and thus 
aggressive marketing of these instruments would not be uncommon (Kiriakopoulos and 
Mavralexakis 2011). Moreover, if the issuer’s profits are shared with the distributor then 
there are incentives for the distributor to ‘push’ the sale of SRP (Bernard et al. 2010). 
Subrahmanyam (2009) shows that distributors may delay educating inexperienced retail 
investors so as to earn more commissions. Szymanowska et al. (2009) posits that reverse 
convertible overpricing could be partly explained by behavioral factors such as 
marketing. Vanini and Dobeli (2010) claims that a communication style which uses 
behavioral finance insights in presenting a structured product is effective. Summing up, 
according to the existing literature, the contact between the product distributor and the 
investor contributes to the explanation of the popularity of SRP.  
If financial intermediaries make relatively more money when they sell SRP and/or 
if there are incentives to ‘push’ the sale of SRP, then investors who get financial 
information from a bank are more likely to invest in SRP than other investors (because 
the bank is also a distributor of these products). We use the CMVM survey on retail 
investors to build a proxy for this effect (Marketing). Marketing is a binary variable equal 
to one if the investor goes personally to the bank to get information regarding financial 
markets and products (see details in the Annex). We conclude that indeed the marketing 
                                                          
14 We lack direct data on product pay-offs, thus we are not able to directly test the view that these 
products actually do add new assets, or merely replicate (potentially at lower transaction costs) existing 
assets. From our most recent knowledge of the Portuguese market it is probably both, but we are not 
able to disentangle them due to lack of information.   
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of SRP is a strong determinant of the investment is SRP for the marketing variable is 
highly significant (model [4]), thus providing a rationale for overpricing. 
It has also been argued that gambling may justify investors’ irrationality when 
they opt for SRP. Bernard et al. (2010) attributes overpricing to the fact that retail 
investors may decide not to be informed about product complexity and thus choose 
randomly with the help of commission-based incentivized distributors. Campbell (2006) 
reports that either investors make random decisions or distributors are very successful 
in marketing and selling. Nicolaus (2010) documents a pattern of observations that is 
likely to be driven by speculative purposes rather than for hedging. We account for these 
possibilities and consider that investors who do not use any source of information at all 
to get informed about financial markets and instruments are gamblers and make random 
decisions. Our ‘gambling’ variable is the proxy we use. It is a binary variable, equal to 
one if the investor does not use any source to get information about financial markets 
and instruments (see details in the Annex). We conclude that these investors are more 
likely to have SRP in their portfolio (model [5]). 
 
4.2. Is trading influenced by investor characteristics?  
We now turn to the possibility that the above mentioned characteristics may also 
play a role in the number of trades in SRP an investor makes. In fact, the retail investor 
makes different choices. One is the investment in SRP or in other financial products (also 
referred to as the decision to ‘participate’). Another is related to the number of trades 
in SRP (or ‘trading frequency’). Most of the SRP products are not liquid, in the sense that 
either there is not a secondary market (that is, the SRP is not listed and, if traded, the 
OTC market is used) or the SRP is listed but trading occurs very infrequently. This means 
that investors in these products generally buy SRP and hold them until maturity. Thus, 
the number of different SRP an investor trades (regardless of the amounts invested) 
during the sample period is a good proxy for the number of trades, and is our proxy for 
trading frequency. We use this proxy as the dependent variable in a count model in which 
the independent variables are those from the previous section. Our negative binomial 




[Table 4 here] 
 
In model [6] we use the base model, with socioeconomic variables only. There 
we can see that male, non-married, more educated investors living in Lisbon and with 
loans trade more frequently than other investors, and that students trade less 
frequently. More importantly, more knowledgeable overconfident investors trade more, 
but those with a gambling attitude do not. On the other hand, the marketing of SRP 
increases trading frequency (at least at the 10% significance level). Thus, not only do we 
conclude that the socioeconomic characteristics of SRP investors and non-investors are 
different but also that the trading frequency depends upon those characteristics. 
 
4.3. Are investors in SRP similar regardless of the type of SRP? 
The literature considers that structured products are not all equal (see, for example, 
Nicolaus 2010, Kiriakopoulos and Mavralexakis 2011) and that demand is strongly influenced 
by product characteristics that should not matter to a rational investor (Nicolaus 2010). In 
this section, we test whether different investors invest and trade in different types of SRP 
(CLN – Credit Linked Notes; CRT – Certificates; ETF – Exchange Traded Funds; CB – 
Convertible Bonds; WAR – Warrants). 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
In Table 5 – Panel A, we present the results of the determinants of the investment in 
different types of SRP for the main variables of interest and conclude that the investors in 
credit linked notes (notes without capital protection) are different than other SRP’s 
investors. Gambling conditions the investment in this type of SRP, but with an unexpected 
negative sign. We suspect that this can be attributed to the relatively low maximum pay-offs 
of these notes, but we do not have information on the products pay-offs to test for this 
possibility. On the other hand, the Literacy and the Overconfidence variables are significant 
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in all but one SRP type, and the Marketing variable in all but two SRP types, thus confirming 
in general the results presented in section 4.1. 
As for the determinants of trading (Table 5 – Panel B), investors in credit linked notes 
are once again different than investors in other types of SRP, and the Gambling variable is 
not relevant in any regression, confirming in this case the results presented in section 4.2. 
 
 
4.4. Robustness issues: Does complexity play a role? 
Our next step is to account for the complexity of the products. For that purpose, 
we define a new variable (complex) which is equal to one if the investor only invests in 
less complex assets (time deposits and treasury bonds), is equal to 2 if he invests in 
stocks and capital protected bonds, does not invest in SRP but may have time deposits 
and treasury bonds, and is equal to 3 is he has SRP, regardless of his other investments. 
An ordered probit model is now estimated with complex as the dependent variable.15 
Results are in Table 6 for the most relevant variables. 
Our previous results are confirmed. In fact, financial knowledge, overconfidence, 
gambling and marketing are positively associated with the investment in more complex 
products. 
 




There is strong consensus that retail investors’ preference for structured 
products is difficult to explain using the standard rational theory and that the increasing 
                                                          
15 We alternatively define complex as one if the investor only invests in less complex assets (time deposits 
and treasury bonds), is equal to 2 if he only invests in stocks and capital protected bonds (and does not 
invest in any other assets), and is equal to 3 if he only invests in SRP (and does not invest in any other 
assets). Results are essentially unchanged and are not reported. 
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popularity of SRP can be better explained by behavioral factors. Overconfident investors 
are more prone to take on excessive risk for which there is no apparent reward and thus 
to invest and trade in SRP. Research also postulates that some retail investors view 
trading in the stock market as an opportunity to gamble. Moreover, it has been put 
forward that aggressive marketing strategies are the main reason for the increasing 
popularity of SRP.  
The evidence we present in this paper is consistent with the view that SRP 
products likely offer value to some informed investors compared to other products, that 
product complexity is a way to complete markets and that SRP allow investors to access 
segments otherwise not available to them. Nonetheless, our results also suggest that 
the increasing popularity of SRP is partially due to behavioral biases: gambling appears 
to be an important motivation for trading and overconfidence drives more trading in SRP. 
Results also suggest that aggressive marketing practices drives trading, thus providing a 
rationale for overpricing. Moreover, gambling may justify investors’ irrationality when 
they opt for some types of SRP. Our evidence on the impact of these behavioral aspects 
on the investment and trading of SRP is novel and helps one to understand how issuers 
and distributors of SRP use investors’ misperception of the involved risks and lack of 
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Table 1 – Socio-demographic characterisation of investors (%) 
 




1.1. Age groups (a)
25-34 5.9 14.2 21.3
35-44 18.6 19.9 20.5
45-54 21.9 20.4 18.6
55-64 21.6 19.7 15.8
65-74 17.1 14.6 13.1
75-84 11.6 8.5 8.4
> 84 3.3 2.7 2.2
Total 100 100 100
1.2. Marital status
Married (b) 68.9 67.1 69.8 (c)
Other 31.1 32.9 30.2 (c)
1.3. Area of residence
Porto 26.9 13.5 10.4
Lisbon 21.5 26.9 21.0
Rest of the country 51.6 59.6 68.6
1.4. Professional status
Senior management (d) 35.2 17.4 5.9
Specialists (e) 21.2 20.5 10.4
White collar (f) 22.5 15.8 14.2
Blue collar (g) 12.3 16.7 29.9
Inactive (h) 8.7 29.6 39.6
1.5. Education (i)
15-24 6.4 18.7 3.6
25-34 26.0 35.2 19.1
35-44 27.9 35.6 12.7
45-54 19.8 30.0 10.2
> 54 10.3 18.9 4.8
(a) Over 25 years of age
(b) With and without civil registry
(c ) In relation to the population over 15
(d) Upper levels of public administration, directors  and business managers
(e) Specialists in science, physics, mathematics, engineering, health, professors, etc.
(f) Office workers and similar
(g) Farmers, industrial workers, mechanics and non-qualified workers
(h) Retired, unemployed, students
(i) Proportion of individuals within each age group who have completed higher education
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1 SRP >50 SRP







> 84 3.8 0.8
1.2. Marital status
Married (b) 72.1 57.7
Other 17.9 42.3
1.3. Area of residence
Porto 20.3 18.3
Lisbon 24.2 41.1
Rest of the country 55.5 40.6
1.4. Professional status
Senior management (d) 36.6 24.4
Specialists (e) 17.5 26.6
White collar (f) 21.6 34.0
Blue collar (g) 14.5 7.5
Inactive (h) 9.8 7.6
1.5. Education
Low (i) 56.3 31.9
Intermediate (j) 21.2 26.0
High (k) 22.5 42.1
(a) Over 25 years of age
(b) With and without civil registry  
(c ) In relation to the population over 15
(d) Upper levels of public administration, directors  and business managers
(e) Specialists in science, physics, mathematics, engineering, health, professors, etc.
(f) Office workers and similar
(g) Farmers, industrial workers, mechanics and non-qualified workers
(h) Retired, unemployed, students
(i) Four or less years of schooling
(j) Between five and twelve years of schooling
(k) Higher education completed
22 
 
Table 3 – Determinants of investment in SRP – probit model 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary variable, equal to one if the investor trades in structured retail products during 
the sample period. The Overconfidence, Marketing and Gambling variables are constructed from the survey (see the Annex); all 
other variables are from the proprietary database. 
 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Const. -2.077 *** -2.099 *** -2.177 *** -2.181 *** -2.248 ***
-37.45 -37.70 -38.54 -38.65 -39.03
Male 0.263 *** 0.257 *** 0.275 *** 0.292 *** 0.29 ***
43.58 42.49 43.12 39.46 39.13
Age -0.003 ** -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002 -0.0003
-2.36 -1.65 -1.49 -1.59 -0.22
Age squared 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
5.88 5.41 5.61 5.69 4.54
Married -0.043 *** -0.047 *** -0.049 *** -0.068 *** -0.067 ***
-6.40 -6.93 -7.18 -8.62 -8.53
High education 0.342 *** 0.313 *** 0.351 *** 0.347 *** 0.346 ***
9.67 8.83 9.82 9.69 9.68
Intermediate educ. 0.196 *** 0.197 *** 0.232 *** 0.215 *** 0.219 ***
5.56 5.57 6.52 6.01 6.12
Basic Education 0.078 ** 0.092 *** 0.095 *** 0.095 *** 0.097 ***
2.22 2.61 2.70 2.71 2.76
Highly skilled 0.195 *** 0.189 *** 0.179 *** 0.153 *** 0.158 ***
7.07 6.87 6.50 5.46 5.63
Skilled 0.003 -0.034 -0.035 -0.042 -0.045
0.11 -1.22 -1.27 -1.52 -1.62
Students -0.083 *** -0.070 ** -0.073 ** -0.074 ** -0.079 **
-2.58 -2.18 -2.26 -2.30 -2.46
Lisbon -0.030 *** -0.043 *** -0.015 ** -0.011 -0.029 ***
-4.48 -6.40 -2.07 -1.52 -3.58
Porto 0.095 *** 0.089 *** 0.121 *** 0.122 *** 0.119 ***
13.15 12.41 15.16 15.21 14.89
Mortgage 0.180 *** 0.143 *** 0.143 *** 0.142 *** 0.142 ***
21.65 17.19 17.12 16.99 16.97
Consumer loan 0.037 *** 0.027 ** 0.027 ** 0.027 ** 0.027 **
3.22 2.33 2.34 2.33 2.36
Literacy 0.394 *** 0.395 *** 0.392 *** 0.388 ***
34.90 34.91 34.61 34.24
Overconfidence 0.091 *** 0.087 *** 0.086 ***
9.29 8.81 8.76




Nº obs with Y=1 31022 31022 31022 31022 31022
Nº observations 560005 560005 560005 560005 560005
LR stat 6814 7929 8015 8036 8067
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs: (i) z-stats in italics ; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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Table 4 – Determinants of trading in SRP – count model 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of different SRP an investor trades during the sample period. The 




[6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Const. -1.591 ** -1.617 ** -1.926 *** -2.031 *** -1.851 **
-2.25 -2.24 -2.60 -2.78 -2.32
Male 1.203 *** 1.147 *** 1.226 *** 1.343 *** 1.361 ***
9.30 8.68 9.23 8.41 9.11
Age 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.006
0.21 0.39 0.56 0.58 0.28
Age squared -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
-0.78 -0.91 -1.01 -1.04 -0.77
Married -0.314 ** -0.285 ** -0.298 ** -0.426 ** -0.427 **
-2.54 -2.30 -2.39 -2.51 -2.55
High education 1.158 *** 1.057 *** 1.103 ** 1.128 *** 1.128 ***
2.99 2.59 2.53 2.82 2.84
Intermediate educ. 0.889 ** 0.84 ** 0.877 ** 0.785 ** 0.785 **
2.25 2.05 2.01 1.96 1.98
Basic Education 0.054 0.064 -0.027 0.024 0.021
0.14 0.16 -0.06 0.06 0.06
Highly skilled 0.369 0.324 0.312 0.134 0.111
1.32 1.17 1.19 0.47 0.39
Skilled -0.265 -0.443 -0.431 -0.475 * -0.467 *
-0.95 -1.59 -1.64 -1.80 -1.78
Students -0.769 ** -0.749 ** -0.766 ** -0.779 ** -0.759 **
-2.16 -2.11 -2.27 -2.34 -2.32
Lisbon 0.446 *** 0.409 *** 0.555 *** 0.586 *** 0.649 ***
3.81 3.32 4.34 4.61 4.07
Porto 0.201 0.207 0.355 ** 0.344 ** 0.358 **
1.52 1.57 2.29 2.32 2.42
Mortgage 0.503 *** 0.297 ** 0.319 ** 0.326 ** 0.330 **
3.87 1.97 2.06 2.07 2.14
Consumer loan 0.560 *** 0.557 *** 0.572 *** 0.574 *** 0.559 ***
3.37 3.13 3.14 3.22 3.15
Literacy 1.074 *** 1.063 *** 1.022 *** 1.054 ***
6.62 6.35 6.21 6.55
Overconfidence 0.359 ** 0.331 ** 0.334 **
2.09 1.95 1.97




Nº observations 560005 560005 560005 560005 560005
LR stat 5881806 5882253 5882345 5882407 5882428
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs: (i) z-stats in italics ; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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Table 5 – Determinants of investment and trading, by type of SRP 
Panel A: Determinants of investment (probit model) 
 
 
Panel B: Determinants of trading (count model) 
 
Note: In Panel A the dependent variable is a binary variable, equal to one if the investor trades in each type of SRP during 
the sample period. In Panel B the dependent variable is the number of different products of each type an investor trades during the 
sample period. The Overconfidence, Marketing and Gambling variables are constructed from the survey (see the Annex); all other 
variables are from the proprietary database. Included in all the models reported in this table are the controls used in model [1] of 
Table 3. 
 
Table 6 – Determinants of investment – ordered probit model 
 
Note: The dependent variable is Complex. The Overconfidence, Marketing and Gambling variables are constructed from 
the survey (see the Annex); all other variables are from the proprietary database.  
CLN CRT ETF CB WAR
Literacy 0.006 0.218 *** 0.351 *** 0.347 *** 0.477 ***
0.14 13.34 8.81 24.64 27.72
Overconfidence 0.063 * 0.073 *** 0.011 0.071 *** 0.044 **
1.80 5.11 0.16 5.79 2.04
Marketing -0.007 0.039 *** 0.012 0.035 *** 0.064 ***
-0.22 2.85 0.23 2.89 3.25
Gambling -0.154 *** -0.015 0.149 *** 0.011 0.041 **
-2.56 -0.87 2.91 0.63 1.96
Nº obs with Y=1 1388 11601 538 15343 4554
Nº observations 560005 560005 560005 560005 560005
LR stat 1310 4848 975 3092 3613
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CLN CRT ETF CB WAR
Literacy -0.111 0.877 *** 1.588 *** 1.023 *** 0.948 ***
-0.49 10.58 3.85 7.57 4.66
Overconfidence 0.003 0.152 ** 0.079 0.291 *** 0.412
0.02 2.12 0.18 4.56 1.58
Marketing -0.109 -0.029 0.796 * 0.051 0.563 **
-0.66 -0.38 1.85 0.73 2.15
Gambling -0.299 -0.088 0.201 -0.021 -0.041
-0.97 -0.69 0.51 -0.39 -0.23
Nº observations 560005 560005 560005 560005 560005
LR stat 576396 475236 1647050 59104 5827721
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs: (i) z-stats in italics ; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
[11] [12] [13] [14]
Literacy 0.326 *** 0.323 *** 0.312 *** 0.302 ***
29.88 29.89 28.64 27.68
Overconfidence 0.119 *** 0.101 *** 0.101 ***
16.61 13.93 13.99




Nº observations 322024 322024 322024 322024
LR stat 23200 23479 24215 24478
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




We use the CMVM survey to construct proxies for overconfidence, gambling and 
marketing variables. We define overconfidence based on the question: “How do you 
rate, on a 1 (very low) to 7 (very high) scale, your own knowledge of financial assets and 
markets?” (Self-evaluation). Answers to this question were compared with a financial 
knowledge variable measured in the 1 to 7 scale, which comes out of the survey as well. 
If the difference between self-reported and actual knowledge is positive and greater 
than 0.9 then overconfidence = 1. We then regress this overconfidence variable on a set 
of socio-demographic investor characteristics. The estimated coefficients of this model 
are used to estimate whether investors in our main database are (are not) 
overconfident, using the same socio-demographic investor characteristics, and 
assuming that the percentage of overconfident investors is equal to the percentage of 
overconfident investors in the survey. Thus, overconfidence=1 for the investors with the 
higher score in the estimated overconfident model.  
Similar procedures are used to construct the gambling and marketing variables. From 
the survey we define the socio-demographic characteristics of the investors who do not 
use any source of information to get informed on financial markets and products 
(investors with a gambling attitude), and those of investors who get information on 
financial markets and products from the bank. Assuming that the percentage of 
gamblers (bank informed) investors in the survey and in the main database are similar, 
gambling=1 (marketing=1) for the investors with the higher score in the estimated 
gambler (marketing) model. 
